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CO-OPERATION BETWEEN CARICOM AND NON-CARICOM COUNTRIES
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate some discussion and 
reflection on the optimal means to achieve co-operation between 
those countries that are not Members of the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and those that are, given the fact that a fairly broad 
range of activities are currently under way within CARICOM, but in 
relative isolation from the rest of the region. The experience of 
the Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee (CDCC) 1 is 
offered as a case study since the establishment of greater linkages 
among Caribbean countries is its major preoccupation.
The paper does not lay emphasis on what is being done to 
advance co-operation, although this is available for study, but 
rather emphasis is placed on how it is being done and why. An 
attempt is also made to evaluate the potential for co-operation and 
to ascertain the pace at which the exercise can proceed.
As this is intended to supplement a more comprehensive study 
on CARICOM and the regional integration movement2, no time will be 
spent on the internal workings of CARICOM itself, except to note 
that the process of closer interaction has not been lineal and has 
suffered setbacks as Member countries' perceptions of their 
national interest change over time.
Passing reference will be made to the internal debate within 
CARICOM, on the issue of widening the geographic scope of its 
activities as opposed to deepening the degree of interaction of 
the existing membership and to evaluate the stage at which the 
process has currently reached.
Some attention will also be given to the various forums and 
institutions through which CARICOM and non-CARICOM States interact, 
but the bulk of the discussion will be dedicated to the rationale, 
genesis and evolution of the CDCC whose primary goal is to 
establish a greater level of interaction between Caribbean 
countries, with a secondary objective of forging linkages between
The Caribbean Development and Co-operation Committee 
(CDCC) is a permanent advisory body to the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) which comprises 21 
Caribbean countries meeting annually at ministerial level to 
formulate and evaluate a programme of co-operative activities among 
its membership.
2 Samuel, Wendell. "An Evaluation of Regional 
Cooperation in the Caribbean in the context of South-South Co­
operation" UWI, Cave Hill, Barbados.
2this group and the rest of the United Nations system through the 
instrumentality of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The experience of the CDCC is instructive in that various 
methods of co-operation have been tried in accordance with the 
demands of Member Governments and as their perceived needs changed 
over time. Nevertheless, despite a fair degree of flexibility in 
trying to adapt to these changing demands, it is by no means yet 
clear which of the modalities is the most appropriate for this 
task. Focus is placed on the CDCC not merely to highlight the 
institution, but to illustrate the inherent problems which any 
institution having to develop a co-operation programme for the 
wider Caribbbean will have to face. These include diversity, weak 
consensus, initial suspicion of the motives of partners and so on. 
An attempt will be made to draw some conclusions based on these 
experiences, in the hope of advancing the discussion towards more 
satisfying conclusions.
3For the purposes of this discussion, the Caribbean referred 
to is that defined by Dr. Eric Williams at the sixteenth session 
of ECLAC in May 1975 
in May 1975 in 
proposing what became 
the CDCC. At that 
time he advocated 
"...The establishment 
of a Caribbean Council 
of ECLA to deal 
specifically with 
Caribbean issues and 
circumstances and to 
embrace all Caribbean 
entities from Belize 
t o  C a y e n n e ,  
irrespective of 
political status".
While the CDCC has been 
expanding its coverage 
from the original 
participation of twelve 
in 1975, including the 
single delegation from 
the West Indies 
Associated States, to 
the current twenty-one 
eligible to participate 
at the eleventh session 
in November 1988, the 
objective of universal 
participation is still 
incomplete, in that a 
number of eligible 
countries do not yet 
participate. But the 
basic definition made 
by Dr. Williams is the 
ultimate goal so that 
basic background 
information on the 
constituency being 
discussed is set out 
at Table 1.
The frame of reference
Aside from the 
evident disparities in size and economic power, with the attendant 
fears of dominance on the part of the smaller actors, other 
difficulties such as linguistic barriers tend also to slow down the 
pace at which interaction is able to proceed. Nevertheless, the
T a b l e I
SELECTED INDICATORS OF CDCC COUNTRIES
COUNTRY SIZE kmZ P0PN<1> GDP/cap<2
Antigua 440 81 2935
Dominica 750 78 1423
Grenada 345 102 1013
M ontserrat 102 12 3555
S t .  K itts /N e v is 269 46 1670
S t . Lucia 616 140 1388
S t . V incent 388 111 883
OECS TOTAL 2910 569 <3>
Bahamas 13942 234 9462
Barbados 431 253 5288
B e lize 22960 170 1226
Guyana 214970 794 654
Jamaica 11424 2336 1042
Trin id a d / To b . 5128 1199 3959
CARICCH TOTAL 271765 5555
Aruba (A ) 193 64 7500
B r it is h  V ir g in  I s .  (A ) 150 12 7101
Cuba 110860 10199 3000
Dom. Rep. 49000 6570 810
H a iti 28000 5500 330
Neth. A n t i l le s  (A ) 800 200 6110
Suriname 163265 400 2510
US V ir g in  I s . ( A ) 344 111 9280
CDCC TOTAL 624377 28611
A n g u illa  (0 ) 91 7 2300
Cayman Is . 260 21 12930
Guadeloupe 1780 300 3151
Guyane 31000 88 1680
M artin ique 1110 300 3717
Puerto Rico 8800 3300 4850
Turks and Caicos (0 ) 417 10 4490
CARIBBEAN TOTAL 667835 32638
Source: ECLAC, IBRD, COB.
<1>Relates to  1986
<2>In c u rre n t US$ in  1986
<3>Totals may not add due to  rounding
(0 )  (A )  Refers to  o bservers ; asso cia te  members of CDCC
4Caribbean is endowed with a range of institutions at the regional 
and subregional levels through which the process of familiarization 
and interaction can take place, some of the most salient of which 
are discussed'below.
The institutional setting
The process of co-operation and co-ordination in the Caribbean 
needs to be seen as a long-term process. It has been ongoing for 
several decades mainly among the English-speaking countries, which 
have a number of specialized institutions acting jointly and 
operating at different levels of specificity. These institutions 
operate with varying constellations of countries and at varying 
levels of concreteness (C) , depending on the degree of cohesion 
which is perceived to exist within each constellation.
Cutting across the geographic spread (G) of each institution 
one must also factor in the functional scope (F) of each as defined 
by its mandates. The more clearly circumscribed its mandate, the 
more likely that it will be empowered to act with concreteness, as 
in the case of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) or the 
Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre (CTRC). Yet the 
more diverse its mandate the more appropriate the institution for 
policy involvement.
Accordingly, where a high degree of similarity and hence 
cohesion is perceived to exist within a group, say within the OECS, 
then the institution acting on behalf of that group will be 
empowered to act with a high degree of concreteness and 
specificity. An attempt to put the concept into diagrammatic form
The analysis assumes a given level of 
political will (W) , in the short- to long­
term so that C+G+F=W, trade offs heeding to 
take place between C or G or F. There is 
accordingly a tradeoff between the degree of 
concreteness, the geographic spread and the 
range of functional tasks to be covered by 
each institution and the leeway open to each 
institution is determined by the level of 
political will extant in each group. This is, 
moreover, assumed to be fixed in the short to 
medium-terms.
Nevertheless, over time it is possible to increase the level 
of political will and this has to be one of the major objectives 
of each organization, since will is the ultimate determinant of 
action. Will is composed by a number of factors, such as historic 
patterns of familiarity and culture (H), potential economic 
benefits to be derived from the activities of the group (E), and 
direct political action (P). The latter factor, direct political
appears at Figure 1.
Figure 1
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5action, is the only one that is amenable to manipulation to bring 
quick change to the level of political will. But it needs to be 
exercised circumspectly, since bold action by one member might be 
perceived to be detrimental by one or more of the others, if even 
to their status within the group. Accordingly, the dictum that 
"each action will bring forth an equal and opposite reaction" is 
applicable not only to physics, but can also apply to international 
relations. For the short-term, caution and gradualness seems to be 
the most appropriate way of increasing political will and the 
evolution of activities based on a genuine consensus the most 
viable means of strengthening political will for the long-term.
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) which is 
regarded as the tightest of the co-operation/integration 
institutions comprises seven small islands having a joint 
population of approximately 570,000 people, with an average 
GDP/capita in 1986 of US$ 1,400 and land area of less than 3,000 
sq. km. scattered over many islands and cays. The OECS treaty which 
was established in June 1981 covers foreign affairs, defence and 
security, and economic affairs very broadly defined. It has an 
administrative and institutional structure which comprises as the 
supreme body the authority of the heads of government, a foreign 
affairs committee, an economic affairs committee, and a central 
secretariat. The major objectives and activities are the promotion 
of economic integration, the issuance and management of a common 
currency through the East Caribbean Central Bank, the co-ordination 
of judicial activities through a joint supreme court, co-ordination 
of civil aviation activities, and the establishment of joint 
overseas missions. Discussions are currently underway to create a 
unified state.
The CDB which was established in 1969 has 17 borrowing 
Members, comprising all CARICOM countries and including Anguilla, 
the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands as borrowers, and Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela as 
non-borrowing regional Members. The bank has had a significant 
impact on regional financial co-operation not only through the 
disbursement of its own funds but also as a coordinator of external 
funding emanating from the Caribbean Group for Co-operation on 
Economic Development (CGCED) to CDB members. It has also performed 
a valuable role in the training of regional specialists in subject 
areas such as project preparation, public finance and economic 
management.
While its geographic spread is wider than CARICOM, its mandate 
is nevertheless fairly circumscribed and specific, which at the 
same time allows its activities to be concrete and an evaluation 
of its performance and impact to be straightforward.
The Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) comprises 13 countries 
having a joint population of 5.7 million. There is a greater 
disparity in size than exists among the OECS between, for example,
6Montserrat at 102 sq. km. and Guyana at almost 215,000 sq km; and 
in income and perceived interest between, for example, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines at US$883/capita on the one hand and the 
Bahamas at US$9462 on the other. In order to contain the 
antagonisms likely to be engendered by such disparities, yet allow 
a fairly high degree of specificity in its programmes, special 
provisions have had to be made for the lesser developed countries 
(LDCs), the OECS and Belize. Nevertheless, the tensions remain.
The functional scope of CARICOM is fairly high. In addition 
to its original objective of economic integration through the 
workings of the Common Market, it has added functional co-operation 
in a number of sectors (such as transport, education, health, 
labor, information, youth and sport) and has as a third major 
objective the,co-ordination of its Members' foreign policy.
While the work programmes are fairly comprehensive and 
measures proposed seem to be fairly concrete, the unanimity rule 
precludes agreement on many of the fundamentals of the integration 
process and the co-ordination of foreign policy and even where 
"agreement" has been achieved, the level of compliance in, for 
example, the Common Market activities is somewhat less than hoped 
for. While this is to be expected, it has, nevertheless, engendered 
a degree of disillusionment with the institution itself and 
encouraged a perception among some of its failure.
The perception is probably due merely to CARICOM's failure to 
satisfy unrealistic expectations, particularly as regards the 
benefits to be derived by its Members from interregional trade and 
the "common market"3. Even so, the benefits to be derived from a 
market of less than six million with a joint GDP of less than US$ 
13 billion will be fairly limited, particularly when many of the 
outputs are competitive and there is only limited scope for 
complementarity.
At the same time some of the non-quantifiable benefits such 
as the more efficient use of intellectual resources, improvements 
in information systems, the development of a more effective joint 
negotiating capacity in international forums have been underplayed. 
But this impatience with performance is not unique to CARICOM, and 
springs from a tendency among policy-makers both at the national 
and regional levels to overestimate the range of viable options 
open to them. There is also a tendency to ignore those aspects of 
institution-building and the establishment of common linkages and 
shared perceptions which are difficult to quantify but are 
essential for effective co-operation. Accordingly, there is a 
tendency to overestimate the speed with which changes can be
As has been implied above, the "common market" exists in 
name only, since sufficient political will has not been mustered 
to enable the necessary supporting legislation to be enacted.
7effected, thus engendering false expectations. The resulting 
impatience holds the danger of hasty policy shifts, thus not 
allowing policies a chance to work and ultimately creating policy 
inconsistency.
The widening of CARICOM to expand its geographic coverage, is 
a tendency which coexists somewhat uneasily with attempts to deepen 
the degree of intensity of CARICOM activities. The impetus for 
widening came essentially from countries outside of CARICOM, which 
not having the option of entering common trading arrangements 
elsewhere and perceiving benefits to be derived from access to the 
CARICOM market, sought association of one form or another. There 
was, nevertheless, impetus for widening the market coming also from 
within CARICOM, essentially from those seeking a bigger market for 
its output than provided by the existing membership and having 
sufficient confidence in its capacity to penetrate the expanded 
market.
The application of Suriname is longstanding, beginning with 
a request for observer status in CARIFTA in 1973. "Liaison" status 
was granted at the Thirteenth Meeting of the Council of Ministers 
in March of that year, which stipulated that "Suriname would be 
allowed to participate in the technical committees in CARIFTA 
subject to the discretion of the chairman of the committee". It 
later participated as observer in a number of meetings of CARICOM 
institutions such as the Conference of Ministers Responsible for 
Health, and standing committees for labor. In 1982, it applied for 
observer status in the Conference of Heads of Government, the 
Common Market Council and the institutions of the Caribbean 
Community.
The application by Haiti for membership in the Community and 
associate membership in the Common Market dates from 1974. The 
application was amended in October 1982 to that of "permanent 
observer in the technical bodies of the Caribbean community, 
particularly in those dealing with agriculture and health". It also 
requested observer status to the Caribbean Development Bank.
The Dominican Republic sought admission as "observer to the 
Caribbean Community" in May 1982. This was subsequently clarified 
to mean "observer status in the institutions that deal with 
functional co-operation".
Both Haiti and the Dominican Republic are currently seeking 
admission to the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) Group in order to 
benefit from the various facilities granted by the EEC to those 
countries within the respective Lome agreements and where Suriname 
already sits. But by and large, with the exception of Suriname and 
recently the Netherlands Antilles which gained observer status on 
par with Suriname in 1988, the process of widening has not moved 
rapidly, the unanimity rule and the need to achieve the desired
8,level of deepening among the existing members being quoted as 
reasons for the reluctance to admit new members.
But in essence, reluctance springs from an unwillingness to 
introduce a greater degree of heterogeneity into a group which 
already has such a wide diversity of perceptions as to the future 
of the institution, given that either Haiti or the Dominican 
Republic has a market, in terms of population size greater than 
that of the existing CARICOM Members, given the greater natural 
resources that they are perceived to have and given the limited 
interaction which has taken place with these countries over time 
because of historical legacies. But the fear of economic dominance 
perhaps plays the major role in explaining the reluctance of the 
existing members to permit new entrants into the common market 
arrangements„
The creation of the Caribbean Development and Co-operation 
Committee (CDCC)4 in November 1975 was a significant step in the 
evolution of Caribbean institutions. For not only did it initiate 
the process of dialogue and interaction between the countries of 
the wider Caribbean, but at the same time it provided an 
opportunity for them jointly to advance their relations with Latin 
America and, at the operational level, with the United Nations 
System.
As late entrants into the United Nations, the English-speaking 
countries of the Caribbean found themselves a part of the regional 
system dominated by Latin American constitutional and political 
modes and perceptions with which they felt uncomfortable. 
Moreover, the developmental preoccupations of continental Latin 
America were not perceived to be identical to those of the small 
islands of the Caribbean. As a consequence, interaction with the 
Regional Economic Commission was limited and cautious.
Proposals by governments to the United Nations Secretary- 
General aimed at establishing an Economic Commission for the 
Caribbean were muted following the creation of a Caribbean Office 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) located in Trinidad and Tobago to cover Aruba, the then 
British Leeward and Windward Islands, Curacao, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The office became fully 
operational on 1 December 1966. Its main objective was to collect 
information about these territories in order to better understand
This section on the CDCC is condensed and updated from 
an ECLAC internal document entitled "A view of the Caribbean" 
prepared in October 1984, as an input to the technical review of 
ECLAC. It was revised and subsequently published by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
provides a more comprehensive discussion of the issues.
9the "special characteristics and problems of small island states 
in the Caribbean and so better represent their interests in the 
activities of the Economic Commission". The work programme of the 
Caribbean Office remained, however, essentially an extension of 
that determined,for Latin America although with the focus in Latin 
America being directed towards integration there was a great deal 
of scope to engage in activities which were currently of relevance 
to Commonwealth Caribbean countries which were endeavouring at this 
time to find mechanisms for co-operation following the demise or 
the West Indies Federation. It therefore gave active assistance in 
the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Caribbean Free 
Trade Association (CARI FT A) , as well as to the establishment of the 
CDB. Other activities included much of the preparatory tasks for 
the implementation of the Agricultural Marketing Protocol, 
facilitating the creation within the CARIFTA of the East Caribbean 
Common Market (ECCM), the establishment of the Caribbean Investment 
Corporation (CIC), and preparatory work facilitating the further 
deepening of the trade integration process. Accordingly, the 
Office worked closely with the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional 
Secretariat on matters connected with the signing of the Treaty at 
Chaguaramas and bringing the CARICOM, into being. Once these 
institutions were established the Caribbean Office began to look 
towards fulfilling other longer term needs for co-operation in the 
wider Caribbean region.
In may 1975 the sixteenth session of ECLA was held in 
Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. Resolution 358(XVI)
establishing the CDCC was prepared by Trinidad and Tobago and 
co-sponsored by Cuba, which also shared some of the concerns of 
Trinidad and Tobago, that "if the Caribbean did not further 
consolidate its efforts it would run the risk of losing its 
identity". The resolution defined the membership of the CDCC as 
those countries fully "within the sphere of action of the ECLA 
Office in Port-of-Spain and the Governments of Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti and other Caribbean countries as they achieve 
independence" .5 By the terms of the resolution the Committee 
would "act as a co-ordinating body for activities relating to 
development and co-operation". The Executive-Secretary of ECLA was 
accordingly asked "to co-operate with the governments concerned on 
matters within his competence on matters which are of concern to 
these countries," and "to undertake studies and promote 
initiatives....designed to strengthen the co-operation of the other 
member countries of ECLA and integration groupings of the Latin 
American region with the Committee..."
In fact, the requirement of independence, while necessary 
for formal membership, has not precluded the participation of non- 
independent members on a basis of equality, since the only 
privilege accorded exclusively to members is the right to vote. 
All matters in the Committee are, however, resolved by consensus.
10
For a better understanding of the Institution that was being 
created it is useful to isolate a few of the important threads that 
were being woven into its backdrop, such as the OPEC oil price 
increase; the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States; the 
Seventh Special Session of the United Nations; and the creation 
of SELA. These events manifested a confidence on the part of the 
developing countries in the mechanism of South-South co-operation 
and the use "of the solidarity deriving therefrom for North-South 
negotiations". At the same time, these events were perceived by 
the countries of the north with unease and policies of 
containment were being developed to counteract them.
The scope of the CDCC work programme was fixed at the first 
meeting. At that stage the perception of the CDCC was one of 
promoting greater co-operation between the Member countries 
themselves and of ensuring a better co-ordination of the inputs of 
technical assistance from all its various sources. The CDCC 
assisted by the secretariat was therefore being empowered to carry 
out two basic tasks. It was mandated to co-ordinate the inputs of 
the various technical assistance agencies within a conceptual 
framework to be defined by the ministerial sessions. It was also 
expected to foster co-operation between the Members, Associate 
Members and Observers of the Committee. The secretariat was 
expected to provide the necessary substantive inputs whenever 
necessary. The debate on the work programme therefore centered 
around making the areas of co-operation and co-ordination as 
complete and all embracing as possible. At that stage no 
project-oriented work programme was envisaged.
Subsequently, emphasis tended to shift from the task of 
co-ordination, the success or failure of which was often difficult 
to measure and which also ran into difficulty with the specialized 
institutions having separate and sometimes conflicting mandates 
with the CDCC, to focus on co-operation as a yardstick by which to 
judge CDCC performance. The mechanism by which co-ordination of 
the outputs of the United Nations system was to take place, the 
interagency meeting, which was scheduled to be held after each CDCC 
meeting was convened twice, but did not have the intended effect, 
partly because of the difficulty experienced by individual 
governments in maintaining consistent policies from one forum to 
another. This was due to a lack of effective internal 
co-ordination of foreign economic policy issues as advanced by 
departments such as finance, planning, trade and foreign affairs, 
but also in lesser degree between the departments responsible for 
social matters such as health, education and culture. In sum the 
co-ordination of external developmental agencies was not effective 
through the CDCC because a necessary pre-condition - the 
co-ordination of national government policy internally, which 
should have taken place between the various ministries operating 
in the international arena - was not itself satisfied. 
Inconsistencies created confusion and conflicting mandates, and
11
agencies tended to revert naturally to instructions emanating from 
their own intergovernmental forums.
Secondly, the secretariat was not able to provide sufficient 
assistance to tfre governments in the task of co-ordinating 
technical assistance inputs from the United Nations family of 
agencies neither was it able to foster the necessary dialogue 
between the governments on the one hand and with the agencies on 
the other. But this task would not have been possible without 
determined and consistent government support in all the relevant 
forums. While some attempt is made through the CGCED, to 
co-ordinate donor country inputs at the national level the task 
of co-ordinating the regional inputs from the international 
agencies remains unfulfilled. The CDCC still provides the only 
forum for this task because of its nearly universal membership and 
its multidisciplinary scope. But this potential will not be 
realized until enough CDCC governments are able to co-ordinate and 
systematize their own foreign policy.
In the absence of co-ordination, focus was therefore placed 
on co-operation. But while South-South co-operation was regarded 
as a necessary part of the process of development by a few people, 
it was regarded by many more as a tactic to strengthen the 
negotiating capacity of the south in the North-South dialogue and 
a shift in emphasis in this direction was to be seen over time.
As the industrial countries deflated their economies after the 
second oil shock experienced recession and as this filtered into 
the Caribbean, attention was focussed on their sources of hard 
currency earnings in the north and they became preoccupied at the 
same time with domestic adjustment policies. The focus therefore 
shifted to domestic preoccupations and to the negotiations with the 
north. Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries (TCDC) 
and Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries (ECDC) were 
therefore relegated in order of importance on the international 
agenda as the short-term took precedence over the medium- and long­
term. In this scenario the international agencies were soon to be 
j udged by the speed with which they were able to transfer 
resources, either material or technical.
The focus by governments on more operational project type 
activities growing out of the CDCC work programme placed it at 
variance with the activities defined by the Economic Commission as 
a whole. As a result the secretariat had to face two sets of 
mandates, one for which it had to be answerable to ministers on an 
annual basis. The scope of the work programme, defined in the 
first place for the task of co-ordination, assumed more daunting 
proportions once it needed to be operationalized, and implemented 
by a small staff with severely limited resources.
The quest of the CDCC in recent years has been one of trying 
to accommodate its policies in the face of the changing needs and
12
policies of its members. Its secretariat has in turn had to try 
to secure some autonomy, in order to make its work programme more 
responsive to these changing demands and perceptions while at the 
same time struggling to obtain the resources needed to fulfill the 
greater demands being made upon it.
It would seem, however, that the matter has now come full 
circle, since at the eleventh session of the CDCC held in November 
1988, CARICOM Members articulated some clear positions through its 
spokesman, the Minister of External Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 
which suggested that new emphasis should be put on co-operation and 
co-ordination particularly between the Caribbean and the other 
United Nations agencies. What remains to be seen is whether the 
preconditions necessary for the success of this phase are now being 
met, by the governments and by the agencies.
After 22 years the two distinct but interrelated objectives 
of the Subregional Headquarters of ECLAC in Port-of-Spain remain 
to create a functionally relevant programme for itself, on the one 
hand, and to ensure a coherent Caribbean input into the United 
Nations system, on the other. These objectives were reflected in 
the early quest of Caribbean governments for a United Nations 
institution with a Caribbean identity and relevance which caused 
the Caribbean Office of ECLA to be established in 1966, and which 
subsequently motivated the establishment of the CDCC, nine years 
later. It is noteworthy that this quest remains as urgent as ever 
and derives from the twin objectives upon which the office was 
founded as an agency for preserving the Caribbean consciousness and 
integrity, and, as an agency for introducing the Caribbean into 
Latin America, and the United Nations system as a whole.
But in the final analysis it must be recognized that an 
institution such as the CDCC, which covers a more diverse grouping 
of countries, of differing historical, cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds and varying size, and with a broad functional mandate, 
will be empowered by its membership only to operate at a fairly 
abstract level, which at the same time might not be perceived by 
the political directorates of its members to be of immediate and 
high priority. This in turn will constrain such an organization to 
operate with relatively weak political support, so that it will 
need to establish a network of constituencies among fairly 
specialized and technical interest groups having longer term 
perspectives, such as the Association of Caribbean Economists 
(ACE), various university study groups, specialists concerned with 
the diffusion of regional languages and creoles, cultural fora and 
other aspects of social development.
Yet the overlapping institutional fabric is necessary and 
desirable to move the process of familiarization, co-operation and 
co-ordination forward at the regional level as a whole, while not 
hampering the pace and intensity at which the various sub-sets can 
interact. It is also evident that a fairly high degree of
13
interaction and co-ordination of policies is necessary at the 
institutional level.
Over time, a fairly substantial stock of operations has 
nevertheless accumulated within the ambit of the CDCC in all the 
varying categories outlined above: co-ordination, co-operation and 
projects, a few of which are described briefly for illustrative 
purposes.
The Caribbean Environmental Programme provides a good example 
of region-wide co-operation which had its genesis in an ECLAC/UNEP 
project located in Port of Spain and commencing in 1977. The 
programme is a comprehensive intergovernmental co-operation 
activity, in fact, with a wider constituency than the CDCC itself, 
covering the insular and coastal States of the Caribbean Sea and 
the Gulf of Mexico, including the Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname and 
the French Department of Guyana, as well as the waters of the 
Atlantic Ocean adjacent to these states and territories.
The Regional Action Plan was prepared after receiving the 
guidance of an advisory panel of eminent Caribbean experts in the 
field and a large number of surveys, reviews and studies were 
prepared and reviewed by the project personnel. After being refined 
by a number of experts, the Plan was adopted by an 
intergovernmental meeting in 1981, as the Action Plan for the 
Caribbean Environment Programme. Substantively it covers areas such 
as environmental assessment and management, education, training and 
the development of human resources, and the necessary support 
measures. Operationally, it covers programme implementation, 
institutional arrangements, financial arrangements and programme 
priorities.
The Caribbean Documentation Center currently comprises six 
data bases mounted on computer, to which on-line access can be 
gained by CDCC Members and other users. The data bases cover 
economic and social data with 17000 records and abstracts, as well 
as agriculture, patents, labor and information technologies. 
Outputs are produced in the form of bibliographies, authority 
files, abstracts, current awareness bulletins as well as on line 
access, electronic mail service and so on. Extensive training and 
technical assistance is also provided at the national level to 
assist countries to establish and upgrade their national data 
bases.
The Statistical Data Bank collects and compiles an array of 
economic data on CDCC countries which provides an input into the 
economic analysis within the office as well as information to 
Member countries and relevant institutions. A series of selected 
statistical indicators is published regularly, for the use of 
researchers, as well as a comprehensive publication of agricultural 
statistics. Direct technical assistance and advisory services are 
provided to regional statisticians, census personnel in the
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REDATAM6 project and to economic and social planners, most recently 
in the establishment of projects data banks.
In the area of Economic and Social Planning a number of 
working groups of planners has been convened to exchange 
experiences 'and to develop techniques and programmes in their 
respective sectors. They have identified a number of activities 
currently forming major aspects of the CDCC work programme such 
as the link between tourism and the environment. Advisory services 
are also provided in conjunction with the Latin American and 
Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) to 
Member countries in preparing national economic plans and 
programmes, and training courses are held in conjunction with other 
agencies in areas such as projects banks, investment programming, 
trade finance, public sector investment programming and so on.
In Demography an ECLAC/CELADE project has completed its fourth 
year of operation and has the objective of assisting governments 
in the integration of population in development planning and in 
formulating and implementing national development policies. 
Programme activities include the provision of advisory services, 
policy guidelines, research, data inputs, staff training and 
equipment for Member governments.
The Caribbean Council for Science and Technology is an 
autonomous intergovernmental body conceived within the CDCC, 
comprising its members and serviced by its secretariat, which meets 
regularly to devise a programme of activities aimed at 
strengthening the capacity of its members in the field of science 
and technology.
In the field of Language training a programme for the Removal 
of Language Barriers has been underway and is currently finalizing 
the project designed to establish a Caribbean Language Institute 
which will include national chapters in all participating 
countries. The programme has already completed activities related 
to language trainers in the region and the fostering of networking 
among the various language institutes in the region.
Retrieval of census data for small areas using micro­
computers (REDATAM).
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The thesis of this paper is that given a fixed quantum of 
political will, which is not variable in the short term, there is 
a tension, or .a tradeoff, if you will, between three sets of 
variables:
a) Universality or geographic scope;
b) Functional spread of activities, as defined by the 
mandates ; and
c) Degree of concreteness of the specific activities.
While recognizing that political will might be varied over 
time, and indeed the objective of each institution is to increase 
the degree of political will available to it since will is the 
determinant of action, the use of direct political intervention for 
that purpose must be judiciously used since it is as likely to have 
the opposite effect. Accordingly, the accretion of political will 
needs to be slow and painstaking and based on a firm consensus of 
the respective parties.
The major institutional actors assign different priorities 
among the variables outlined above, a factor which influences the 
nature of each of them, as follows:
a) The OECS gives primacy to concreteness and functional 
spread, in that order, with no concern for universality ?
b) CARICOM gives primacy to widening its functional scope 
and seems to accept, although only implicitly, a lower priority for 
concreteness. Overall it has a fairly weak commitment to widening?
c) The CDB by its nature values the concreteness of a legal 
contract, and has widened its geographic scope to a greater extent 
than CARICOM, but preserves a high degree of specificity in its 
work programme;
d) Similar comments refer to the CTRC which has wide 
geographic coverage, a very narrow subject focus but a relatively 
unconcrete manner of operation, in that its task is mainly 
advisory; and
e) For the CDCC, universality is its raison d 'être. At the 
same time, its functional scope is fairly broad primarily because 
non-CARICOM actors have fewer institutional options. Accordingly, 
the level of concreteness of its operations needs to be fairly low.
Given these facts, the conundrum which the CDCC needs to solve 
relates to the appropriate modality, or more realistically the
Conclusions and Recommendations
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appropriate mix of means, to be used in advancing the level of co­
operation among the diverse grouping that comprises the Caribbean.
Moving from the diffuse to the concrete in a continuum, the 
following modalities suggest themselves: consultation, co­
operation, co-ordination, specific project activities, joint 
initiatives requiring legislation and policy harmonization.
Realistically, the bulk of CDCC activities will need to 
cluster around the categories of consultation and co-operation, 
with co-ordination to take place in areas relating to the United 
Nations family of institutions, if the necessary consensus can be 
established within the CDCC and in the United Nations system. This 
emphasis should not preclude concrete project activities where a 
sufficient consensus has been reached as to the need for such 
region-wide activities as is the case in information.
The focus on the more diffuse activities nevertheless creates 
a dilemma for the CDCC, in so far as those having opportunities for 
more concrete action in such fields, the OECS and to a lesser 
extent CARICOM, might regard such initiatives as superficial and 
useless unless they can be persuaded that region-wide interaction 
is itself a worthwhile objective. One means of accommodating to 
this constraint has been to identify a special constituency of the 
small island countries both within and outside of the OECS, since 
they are more likely to arrive at effective solutions to common 
problems acting jointly.
For the larger countries, some of whom are attracted by the 
perceived economic benefits to be gained from a wider market, there 
is need to sustain their interest in those other activities which 
are feasible in the short or medium terms so that with the growth 
of greater familiarity and understanding more concrete activities 
on a regional basis can become acceptable. In the process the 
opportunity should not be lost to create and nurture those region- 
wide projects or facilities which can best satisfy commonly 
identified needs.
As the CDCC enters its fourteenth year of existence it retains 
a unique vision so well expressed by the late Dr. Eric Williams in 
May 1975, "to deal with Caribbean issues and circumstances and to 
embrace all Caribbean entities from Belize to Cayenne, irrespective 
of political status". The membership of CDCC is wider than ever 
before although it is by no means complete and more time will be 
needed before all potential actors in the Williams framework will 
be convinced about the benefits of participation. It nevertheless 
provides the forum which will permit the largest grouping of small 
states, with diverse cultural origins yet all presently so similar 
in composition and in the problems they must solve, to work 
together to fashion solutions for them. For as time passes it 
becomes clear that the peoples of the region are complementing 
their traditionally outward vision with an inward one in an attempt
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to resolve those uniquely regional problems determined by size, 
location and culture to which the outside has no convincing answer. 
So we see a potential grouping of 25 Caribbean entities perhaps 
with different constitutional arrangements, all seeking answers to 
the same fundamental issues and circumstances.
In a world in which the interaction between states and other 
international actors is becoming increasingly more complex and 
intense, all Caribbean States are no doubt anxious to know the 
future of their nation states as currently constituted. For while 
the boundaries of national jurisdiction are being eroded in even 
the largest states it is those small and open states of the 
Caribbean that face the most serious consequences of this erosion. 
They will be the first to fall as casualties if this erosion cannot 
be halted. And if it is found to be an immutable process for the 
states the inhabitants of these islands will need to know what 
measures must be taken to preserve and develop those cultural and 
psychological elements necessary to sustain the future integrity 
of their societies.
The original task of CDCC, to foster co-operation and 
co-ordination between the diverse countries of the region, remains 
valid. These modalities remain the most likely to arrive at 
rational solutions to common problems as well as the most efficient 
in maximizing those benefits to be derived from increasingly scarce 
resources. Co-operation and co-ordination and the development of 
regional approaches remain the most effective means of 
circumventing the limits to the absorptive capacities of small 
states. Development plans and policies that contain even minimal 
elements of co-operation and co-ordination are necessary to 
maximize the benefits to be derived from the regional market and 
to benefit from those resource complementarities which exist in the 
region and might make it feasible to penetrate world markets. As 
resources become more scarce Caribbean countries can ill afford the 
duplicative and unco-ordinated, and sometimes conflicting, 
initiatives of many isolated actors.
In a situation of rapid technological change with the 
attendant need at the national level for structural transformation, 
governments with a crisis mentality cannot permit themselves to be 
seduced into believing that the solution lies in "a quick fix". The 
danger of focusing solely on the short term is one to which 
governments of the region are particularly prone, since most of 
them must face well-informed and highly articulate electorates 
after relatively short periods of time. Activities which do not 
hold out the promise of short-term benefit have therefore tended 
to be relegated to a lower level of priority. But the overriding 
problems remain.
The CDCC provides a unique vantage point from which to monitor 
developments in the region as a whole, and therefore to perceive 
longer-term trends and issues. This derives from its wide
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geographic spread the multidisciplinary nature of its work 
programme and a growing research capability facilitated by the 
Caribbean Documentation Center and the Statistical Data Bank which *
are integral parts of its secretariat. While the Member 
Governments might not therefore be able to make the resources 
available to fully explore long-term issues it is a service which 
the secretariat, linked as it is with the wider network of United 
Nations human resources might be entrusted to perform.
The CDCC must not be judged by its capacity to transfer 
resources for short-term development. Its function is essentially 
to provide the vehicle for conveying Caribbean regional policy into 
the United Nations system, to ensure that the output of that system 
is rational, efficient and co-ordinated. This is a major aspect of 
the terms of reference of the Regional Economic Commissions as 
mandated by General Assembly Resolution 32/197 which intends that 
they become "the main general economic and social development 
centers within the United Nations for their respective regions".
But Caribbean regional policy is still at an early stage of 
articulation. Economic and social policy is not yet fully 
co-ordinated at the national level and therefore the message 
contained through foreign policy tends to be ambiguous and 
sometimes lacking in coherence. Moreover, the perception of the 
region as defined within the CDCC is not yet clear to all its 
members. While some recognize the region in its totality as a 
valid focus for certain types of regional initiative, others only 
recognize a part of it and even then only for closely circumscribed 
types of action or for some specific acts.
This incomplete perception is due in part to the fact that 
foreign policy is a relatively recent responsibility for most CDCC 
Members and the first focus has tended to be placed on the major 
economic actors, sources of trade and finance. The problem is 
therefore in the nature of a cycle, underdevelopment results in a 
lack of adequately co-ordinated domestic policies which is 
reflected externally as national actors speak with separate voices.
This in turn leads to ambiguous, duplicative and inefficient inputs 
from abroad into the domestic developmental process, which are, as 
a consequence, rendered less effective.
It will take some time before the full benefit to be derived 
from co-operation and co-ordination within the framework of the 
CDCC is fully understood and accepted and still longer before this 
perception can be translated into a working reality. In the 
interim, therefore, it is the responsibility of the CDCC 
secretariat itself to fully understand and develop these concepts 
and the implications which flow from them, and with the support of 
those other committed governmental and institutional operatives, 
sustain the ideal until such time as a sufficient level of 
political will can be mustered at the level of the governments to 
make these goals a reality.
Accordingly, any realistic proposals for co-operation and co­
ordination will need to be guided by past efforts and achievements 
and actors will need to be satisfied with fairly modest results in 
the short- to medium-terms.
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